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This study examined the development of social-pragmatic comprehension in 170 Finnish 
four- to eight-year-old children. The children were asked socially and contextually 
demanding questions targeting their social-pragmatic language processing, and to explain 
their correct answers in order to elicit their awareness of how they had derived the answers 
from the context. The results showed that the number of correct answers increased especially 
between the ages of four and seven years. We found that questions demanding contextual 
processing without mind-reading were the easiest to understand, followed by questions 
demanding processing of feelings of others and false beliefs. The questions demanding 
understanding of relevant language use and processing of contextual factors including 
mental states and intentions were the most challenging for the children. Between four and 
five years of age there was a remarkable developmental phase in children’s ability to give 
proper explanations.
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UNDERSTANDING CONTEXTUAL AND SOCIAL MEANING  
IN TYPICALLY DEVELOPING FINNISH-SPEAKING  
FOUR- TO EIGHT-YEAR-OLD CHILDREN
Introduction 
Understanding contextual and social meaning calls for many kinds of 
linguistic, cognitive and social abilities, including the ability to direct attention 
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to relevant factors, to inference and to understand other people’s intentions, 
motives and emotions (Cummings, 2009; Perkins, 2007; Sperber & Wilson, 
2012). Pragmatic skills refer to a person’s ability to utilize relevant contextual 
information in utterance interpretation and expression, in different kinds of 
communication situations (Sperber & Wilson, 1995). The search for relevance is 
a basic feature of human cognition, and thus people automatically pay attention 
to information that is relevant to them and aim to use relevant utterances only. 
In this field of study, context is conceptualised as a complex concept including 
linguistic, para- and extralinguistic, physical, cultural and cognitive aspects 
(Mercer, 2000; Prutting, 1982; Sperber & Wilson, 1995). In communicative 
situations, the ongoing conversation and subtle details of a situation shape 
the relevant contextual information constantly (Gibbs & Colston, 2012). When 
interpreting contextual factors, the ability to inference allows the interpreter to 
make connections between different kinds of information and link them together 
(Leinonen, Letts, & Smith, 2000; Sperber & Wilson, 2002). Inference therefore 
plays a significant role in the pragmatic comprehension process, allowing 
the interpreter ‘to fill in the gaps’ between the literal meaning of an utterance 
and what is actually intended (Searle, 1975). 
During daily communication people also need to be aware that individuals 
may possess differing mental perspectives and expectations that must be taken 
into account in order to effectively understand the meaning of the utterance 
(O’Neill, 2012). The ability to take into account the mental perspective of 
others is traditionally called Theory of Mind (ToM), defined as a person’s 
ability to infer one’s own and others’ mental states, such as beliefs and 
intentions, and behave accordingly (Baron-Cohen, 2000; Premack & Woodroff, 
1978). In addition, communication requires the ability to interpret others’ feelings 
– a multidimensional process involving retrieving and connecting information 
from different sources (e.g. verbal utterance and body language, prosody and 
shared knowledge). Keeping in mind that pragmatic communication in social 
situations requires the involvement of social cognitive factors such as ToM and 
interpretation of feelings, we adopt the use of the term social-pragmatic ability. 
This study focuses on the development of the ability to utilize 
contextual information in understanding relevant language use, intentions, 
beliefs, and feelings. In the last decade the study of social and pragmatic 
abilities has increased substantially (e.g. Angeleri & Airenti, 2014; Bosco 
& Gabbatore, 2017; Loukusa, Leinonen, & Ryder, 2007), which has led to 
the possibility to develop new research-based methods for assessing 
the development of such capabilities in typically developing (TD) 
children. The adopted approach, involving a close integration of social and 
pragmatic comprehension skills in structured assessment, is based on previous 
studies that suggest a strong relationship between ToM and communicative 
abilities (Lohmann, Tomasello, & Meyer, 2005; Miller, 2006; Nelson, 2005; see 
also Hyter, 2017; Perkins, 2011). 
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Development of social-pragmatic comprehension 
The development of social-pragmatic comprehension involves children’s 
increasing ability to use context and understand others’ intentions in utterance 
interpretations. Previous studies have shown that the ability to answer 
questions that demand complex contextual processing, such as understanding 
implicit meanings, develops with age (Loukusa et al., 2007; Loukusa, Ryder, 
& Leinonen, 2008; Ryder & Leinonen, 2003). At around eight years of age 
children begin to pay greater attention to all of the available relevant cues, 
including paralinguistic aspects of communication, and they no longer focus 
substantially on propositional content (Bosco, Angeleri, Colle, Sacco, & Bara, 
2013; Morton & Trehub, 2001). An earlier study by Loukusa et al. (2007) 
showed that at the age of seven children can connect different kinds of contextual 
information in order to infer the implicit meaning of an utterance. Nevertheless, 
even if young children cannot yet resolve the implicit meanings of contextually 
complex utterances, they can utilize contextual information when identifying 
the object of references from the context (Bezuidenhout & Sroda, 1998; 
Loukusa, et al., 2007; Ryder & Leinonen, 2003) or interpreting simple indirect 
utterances (Bucciarelli, Colle, & Bara, 2003). Compared to older children, 
the younger ones experience more challenges in understanding the intentions 
of utterances when there is a discrepancy between the literal meaning and 
the intended one as, for example, in deceitful and ironic expressions (Bosco 
et al., 2013; Bosco & Gabbatore, 2017a; Bucciarelli et al., 2003; Filippova 
& Astington, 2010; Glenwright & Pexman, 2010; Happé, 1993; Harris 
& Pexman, 2003; Wilson, 2013). It has been suggested that this could reflect 
the level of contextual complexity and inferential processes involved in different 
types of contextually demanding expressions (Bosco et al., 2013; Bucciarelli et 
al., 2003; Loukusa et al., 2007; Loukusa et al., 2008). The developmental trend 
shown in children’s performance on different types of pragmatically challenging 
tasks (e.g. Bosco et al., 2013; Bucciarelli et al., 2003) suggests that the assessment 
of children’s social-pragmatic performance should include questions requiring 
different kinds of contextual processing in order to get a holistic picture of their 
social-pragmatic skills.
Previous studies also suggest a developmental relationship between 
pragmatic and ToM abilities, as in order to communicate successfully children 
need to take into account others peoples’ needs (Happé, 1993; Perkins, 2007; 
Wilson, 2013). Nelson (2005) describes the development of ToM abilities 
as the process of entering into the community of minds, one which becomes 
evident in TD children when they start to exhibit the ability to talk about their 
own experiences in the past or in the future, discuss or speculate with others as 
to why things happen, and contemplate the reasons of why people do things. 
The basic understanding of others’ minds is measured traditionally using 
the so-called false belief (FB) tasks, and seems to develop between the ages 
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of three and five (Siegal & Beattie, 1991; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001; 
Wellman & Lagattuta, 2000). At this age, children are also able to infer other’s 
knowledge based on perceptual experience (Wimmer, Hogrefe, & Perner, 
1988). At the age of five children also start to show belief based reasoning 
when they distinguish ideological (such as religious) beliefs from factual and 
preference-based beliefs (Heiphetz, Spelke, Harris, & Banaji, 2013). ToM skills 
continue to develop into adolescence (Bosco, Gabbatore, & Tirassa, 2014), and 
they seem to contribute to understanding the implied meanings involved in more 
complex communicative structures, such as sophisticated lies (Talwar, Gordon, 
& Lee, 2007) and ironies (Nilsen, Glenwright, & Huyder, 2011). 
In addition to ToM, the other social cognitive factor associated with 
children’s everyday communication skills is their ability to recognize other 
people’s feelings and emotions. Recognition of feelings and emotions starts 
to develop early on with the interpretation of the caregiver’s emotions from 
his/her clear facial expressions (Hoehl & Striano, 2010). A sophisticated and 
multi-sensory1 understanding of feelings and emotions develops and manifests 
itself during childhood, for example, in children’s responses to other’s behavior 
and spontaneous conversation (Dunn, 1987). Since this study is focused on 
social-pragmatic contextual comprehension, the question of the development 
of feelings recognition is centered on looking at how children can utilize and 
connect contextual cues in order to recognize other’s feelings.
The ability to reflect on one’s own answers is an ability that develops over 
time and is connected to social-pragmatic abilities. Explaining one’s answers 
is a verbal activity, demanding many cognitive abilities, such as recognizing 
the difference between action and intention (Donaldson, 1986). A study by 
Donaldson showed that even if already three-year-olds can distinguish between 
cause and effect, it is only at the age of eight that children develop the ability to 
use words such as ‘because’ and ‘so’ when giving deductive explanations; this 
finding was later supported by Loukusa et al. (2008). It was shown that even 
though young children succeeded in explaining some of their correct answers to 
pragmatically challenging questions, it was only between the ages of eight and 
nine when they became competent (> 80%) at explaining their correct answers.
The present study
Despite the large number of studies conducted in the field of pragmatic 
development (e.g. Bezuidenhout & Stroda, 1998; Ryder & Leinonen, 2003; 
Spencer, 2001), there is still a need for systematic and detailed research focused 
on the development of children’s ability to utilize different kinds of contextual 
information in social-pragmatic comprehension (see also: O’Neill, 2012). 
Moreover, it is important to develop new, research-based social-pragmatic 
comprehension tasks in order to assess the ability to utilize contextual cues and 
understand intentions (see also: O’Neill, 2012, 2014).
1 i.e. connecting information from facial expression, body language, prosody, etc.
413 S. LOUKUSA, L. MÄKINEN, I. GABBATORE,  
P. LAUKKANEN -NEVALA, E. LEINONEN
Previous studies suggest that pragmatic abilities develop over time, and 
even though young children can utilize contextual information in simple familiar 
situations (Bezuidenhout & Sroda, 1998; Loukusa et al., 2008), they may have 
difficulties with more unfamiliar and demanding tasks (Bosco et al., 2013; Bosco 
& Gabbatore, 2017a, 2017b; Bucciarelli et al., 2003; Glenwright & Pexman, 
2010; Harris & Pexman, 2003; Loukusa & Leinonen, 2008). In this study 
we utilized a battery of tasks called Pragma, which enables us to investigate 
a wide range of social-pragmatic abilities in typically developing (TD) 
children. The first aim of the study is to investigate the pattern of 
development of social-pragmatic abilities in four to eight years old children, 
expecting that, in line with previous studies, such capabilities progress with 
age. Secondly, we aimed to investigate differences in children’s performance 
on different kinds of social-pragmatic tasks involving: (1) Contextual inference 
without mind-reading (ToM), (2) Contextual inference with mind-reading 
(ToM), (3) Relevant language use, (4) Feelings recognition, and 
(5) Understanding of False Beliefs. On the basis of earlier studies (e.g. 
Bosco et al., 2013; Bucciarelli et al., 2003) showing that children’s performance 
in pragmatic tasks is affected by the level of inferential and contextual 
complexity, we expect to observe a different pattern of performance on 
the different kinds of Pragma tasks. 
Moreover, some earlier research (e.g. Letts & Leinonen, 2001; Loukusa et 
al., 2008) shows that children’s ability to explain their correct answers develops 
between the ages of four and eight. Thus, the third aim of this study is to broaden 
the knowledge about how age impacts the awareness of the comprehension 
processes (i.e. the ability to explain one’s own answers).
A deeper understanding of the typical development of social-pragmatic 
comprehension is an important first step in the process of detecting difficulties 
and delays in clinical populations. At the moment, it is well known that 
social-pragmatic difficulties are common in many childhood disorders, for 
example in autism spectrum disorders (ASD; e.g. Angeleri, Gabbatore, Bosco, 
Sacco, & Colle, 2016; Happé, 1993; Loukusa & Moilanen, 2009), specific 
language impairment (SLI; e.g. Letts & Leinonen, 2001; Ryder, Leinonen, 
& Schulz, 2008), and attention deficit hyperactivity disorders (ADHD; e.g. 
Loukusa, 2017; Väisänen, Loukusa, Moilanen, & Yliherva, 2014). These 
difficulties affect everyday communication and relationships with others. 
According to Conti-Ramsden and Botting (2004), pragmatic difficulties are 
one of the core factors contributing to social well-being issues of children 
with SLI. At the moment, in Finland the assessment of children’s 
comprehension abilities is essentially based on linguistic comprehension. 
It is clear that without also investigating social-pragmatic comprehension 
it is not possible to ascertain a full picture of children’s functional 
understanding that affects their performance in real life situations. 
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Method 
Participants
A total of 170 Finnish extraction, Finno-Ugric origin and monolingual Finnish 
four- to eight-year-old TD children (83 boys and 87 girls) participated in the study 
(Table 1). The children were recruited from day-care nurseries and mainstream 
schools. Participation was voluntary and confirmed by written consent by 
the child’s parents. The Ethical Committee of the Northern Ostrobothnia 
Hospital District approved this study. 
The parents were asked to complete a preliminary data sheet about 
their child’s language development, and if the parents did not report any 
developmental diagnosis or delays, the child was included in the study. To 
receive background information on the children’s language skills, the Token Test 
for Children, TTFC-2, (McGhee, Ehrler, & DiSimoni, 2007) and the Finnish 
version of the Test of Word Finding, TWF-2, (German, 2000) were conducted.
Table 1. Participant characteristics
Age group
(years) N
Gender Age (years;  months) TTFC-2
1 TWF-22
Boys Girls Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
4 31 16 15 4;6 (0;4) 23.9 (7.7) 106.7 (13.4)
5 34 16 18 5;5 (0;3) 31.1 (6.5) 107.2 (13.6)
6 38 21 17 6;6 (0;3) 35.8 (4.3) 106.1 (13.0)
7 36 15 21 7;8 (0;3) 37.5 (3.4)   89.3 (11.5)
8 31 15 16 8;4 (0;3) 38.9 (3.3)   97.7 (13.0)
Note: TTFC-21: Token Test for Children, Second Edition, raw scores. The raw scores (maximum 
score is 46) instead of standard scores had to be used, since the test is not standardized in Finnish 
(there is a lack of standardized language measures in Finnish suitable for children aged 
from 4 to 8 years).
TWF-22: Test of Word Finding, Second Edition, standard scores 90–110 average; 80–89 low/below 
average; 70–79 deficient.
Research methods and material 
The Pragma consists of a battery of tasks which aim to evaluate children’s 
ability to understand contextual meanings, intentions and relevant language use. 
The given context consists of short verbal scenarios that are presented together 
with color pictures, small characters, plastic animals or a story. Furthermore, 
they are presented in short sections, so as to minimize memory and linguistic 
processing requirements. In line with earlier studies that assess pragmatic 
comprehension (e.g. Leinonen, Ryder, Ellis, & Hammond, 2003; Loukusa, et 
al., 2007), questions and scenarios were kept as grammatically and lexically 
simple as possible. The materials consist of 39 questions. Correct answers 
require the ability to understand the implied meaning of the utterances. Some 
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questions were also used in our earlier studies (e.g. Loukusa et al., 2007; 
Loukusa et al., 2008). They vary according to contextual utilization, social 
language use, and understanding of intentions, thoughts, beliefs and feelings. 
Being conscious of the multidimensional aspects of the processing demands of 
the questions in this study, we roughly classified them into categories according 
to the phenomenon that each question is primarily focusing on. In the Pragma 
tasks, different kinds of questions vary in number. Most of the questions 
measure contextual inference with ToM (n = 18) because it has been shown 
that these kinds of questions cause particular challenges for children with 
social-pragmatic difficulties, such as ASD (Loukusa & Moilanen, 2009). 
Since the ability to derive a conclusion by connecting information from 
different sources is central in pragmatic understanding (Leinonen et al., 2000; 
Sperber & Wilson, 1995), the second most common question type is Contextual 
inference without ToM demand (n = 10). The battery of tasks is composed of 
different question types as follows (see Table 2 for question examples).
Contextual inference with ToM demand (n = 18). Questions primarily 
focus on the child’s ability to derive conclusions by connecting information 
from different sources (e.g. verbally given information, pictorial information and 
world knowledge) and taking into account others’ mental states and emotions. 
These questions require a good knowledge of social behavior.
Contextual inference without ToM demand (n = 10). Questions primarily 
focused on the child’s ability to derive a conclusion by connecting information 
from different sources (e.g. information given verbally, pictorial information 
or world knowledge).
Feelings recognition (n = 5). Questions focused on the ability to 
understand feelings based on given contextual cues that are primarily verbal.
Relevant language use (n = 4). Questions focused on the understanding 
of the norms regulating the relevant language use, i.e. the ability to choose 
a proper way of saying something in order to achieve one’s own goal and 
taking into account the situation; this ability requires utilizing contextual cues 
as well as social and world knowledge.
False belief (n = 2). Questions focused on the ability to solve FB tasks (i.e. 
change-in-location task and unexpected content task). These questions evaluate 
the ability to understand others’ mental states – often required in the understanding 
of pragmatically demanding scenarios.
In addition, the children were asked to give explanations for their correct 
answers (How do you know that?) to 13 questions in order to explore if and 
how the children are aware of the way they utilize context in their answers 
(see Table 2).
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The sessions were videotaped, and the data was orthographically 
transcribed from the videotapes. The scoring was done from the transcriptions. 
An explanation question was only asked and scored if a correct answer was 
given to the first question, since the purpose of the explanation questions was 
to examine whether the child is aware of and can explicitly articulate the factors 
(verbal and pictorial context, world and social knowledge) that he or she has 
utilized in the comprehension process. 
In order to check the reliability of scoring, interrater reliability (intra-class 
correlation coefficient) was calculated between the scores assigned by two 
researchers, (SL and LM), both experts in language and pragmatics. The 
intra-class correlation coefficient between the two raters on a sample of ten 
children for scoring answers was .985, and for scoring of explanations .984, 
indicating that that the scoring was reliable. Cronbach’s alpha showed excellent 
internal consistency of the battery in answers (α = .927) and good internal 
consistency in explanations (α = .794). 
Statistical Analysis 
The relationship between age and pragmatic answer score was modelled by 
linear regression analysis, where age was used to predict the scores of correct 
answers. The value of the effect size in the relationship between age and 
pragmatic answer score was calculated by Pearson’s correlation coefficient, and 
interpreted according to Cohen (1992). A one-way unrelated ANOVA was used 
to explore differences between age groups and post hoc tests were conducted 
with Tukey HSD test . The effect sizes of group comparisons were calculated 
using the Cohen’s d. Since the explanation question was asked only if a correct 
answer was given, relative frequency scores (i.e. the number of incorrect 
explanations in proportion to correct answers) were used when analyzing 
explanations between groups. 
Results
Pragmatic answer scores 
Linear regression analysis demonstrated a significant association between 
age (in months) and the children’s scores (Adjusted R2 = 0.611, p < .001). 
The scores increased by 0.4 points (95% CI = 0.36−0.45) with every month of 
age. The effect size for age and pragmatic answer scores was large (r = .783).
After analysing age as a continuum, children were divided into different 
age groups, and the performance between the age groups was compared. 
A one-way unrelated ANOVA showed that there was a difference between age 
groups in answer scores (F = 67.174, p < .001, df = 4). Post hoc tests (Tukey 
HSD) showed that when comparing adjacent age groups, there was a significant 
difference between four- and five-year-olds (p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.24), 
five- and six-year-olds (p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.97) and six and 
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seven-year-olds (p = .043, Cohen’s d = 0.68). Although there was a moderate 
effect size in the comparison between seven- and eight-year-olds, the difference 
was not significant (p = .345, Cohen’s d = 0.61).
Table 3. Correct answers of different question types by age groups
Question type 4 years 5 years 6 years 7 years 8 years
Contextual inference with ToM demand 
(n = 18)
Mean   4.4   7.9     11.5 13.7 14.6
SD   2.9   3.4       3.7   2.5   2.8
Abs. ƒ (%) 24.6 43.8 64 75.9 83.9
Contextual inference without ToM 
demand (n = 10)
Mean    6.1    7.7   8.7   9.1    9.7
SD 2    1.7   1.2   1.1    0.9
Abs. ƒ (%)   60.6 77.4 87.4 90.8 96.8
Feelings recognition (n = 5)
Mean   2.6 3.7    3.9 4.2 4.5
SD   1.2   0.8 1 0.9 0.77
Abs. ƒ (%) 51.6 73.5 77.9 83.3 90.3
Relevant use of language (n = 4)
Mean     0.8   1.6   2.2 3  3.4
SD   1   1.2   1.2    0.9  0.9
Abs. ƒ (%) 21 40.4 54.6 74.3 83.9
False Beliefs (n = 2)
Mean   0.7   1.3   1.8   1.8   1.9
SD   0.9   0.8   0.4   0.5   0.2
Abs. ƒ (%) 35.5 64.7 88.2 87.5 96.8
Total (n = 39)
Mean 14.6 22.2 28.1    31.6 34.1
SD   6.2   6.1   6.1   4   4.2
Abs. ƒ (%) 37.4 56.9 72.1 81 87.4
Note: Absolute frequency (Abs. ƒ) means percentage of correct answers in the question type in the 
age group.  
Comparison of different question types 
When comparing the processing demands of the different question types in 
general, the percentages of correct answers showed that Relevant language use 
and Contextual inference with ToM demand questions were the most demanding 
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question types, whereas Contextual inference without ToM demand questions 
were the easiest ones (Table 3). The children’s number of correct answers at 
Feelings recognition and False Belief questions fell in between the above 
mentioned questions. 
A one-way unrelated ANOVA showed that there was a diff erence between 
age groups in all question types: Contextual inference with ToM demand 
(F = 59.343, p < .001, df = 4), Contextual inference without ToM demand 
(F = 29.978, p < .001, df = 4), Feelings recognition (F = 18.686, p < .001, 
df = 4), Relevant language use (F = 30.541, p < .001, df = 4) and False Beliefs 
(F = 21.364, p < .001, df = 4). A post hoc test (Tukey HSD) showed that, when 
comparing adjacent age groups, there was a signifi cant diff erence in Contextual 
inference with ToM demand questions between four- and fi ve-year-olds 
(p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.08), fi ve- and six-year-olds (p < .001, Cohen’s 
d = 1.03) and six- and seven-year-olds (p = .029, Cohen’s d = 0.68). In 
Contextual inference without ToM demand questions, the diff erence was 
signifi cant between four- and fi ve-year-olds (p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.89) and 
fi ve- and six-year-olds (p = .033, Cohen’s d = 0.67). In Feelings recognition 
questions, a signifi cant diff erence was found between four- and fi ve-year-olds 
(p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.08), in Relevant language use questions between 
four- and fi ve-year-olds (p = .024, Cohen’s d =0.70) and six- and seven-year-olds 
(p = .012, Cohen’s d = 0.76), and in False belief questions between four- and 
fi ve-year-olds (p = .001, Cohen’s d = 0.70) and fi ve- and six-year-olds (p = .011, 
Cohen’s d = 0.77). 
Figure 1. Mean score of correct answers and explanations in age groups from four to eight years. The answer 
score contains only scores from questions that contained follow-up questions (max = 13).
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Developmental trend of explanations 
Thirteen of the questions contained a follow-up question requiring 
an explanation, provided that the child gave a correct answer to the initial question. 
Therefore, to explore a child’s ability to provide explanations, the number of 
correct answers had to be taken into account (Figure 1). Analysis of the relative 
frequency (number of correct explanations/ f x 100%) showed that four-year-
old children were able to successfully explain 46% of their correct answers, 
five-year-old children –  69%, six-year-old – 68%, seven-year-old – 77% and 
eight-year-old – 81% of them. A one-way unrelated ANOVA showed that there 
was a difference between age groups in their ability to give an explanation 
for correct answers (F = 12.433, p < .001, df = 4). According to a post hoc 
test (Tukey HSD), this was caused by the age difference between four and 
five-year-olds (p < .001). 
Discussion
This study explored the development of the social-pragmatic comprehension 
abilities in four- to eight-year-old children. The ability to process contextual 
information and recognize others’ intentions is important in many areas of 
children’s life. Between four and eight years of age, children utilize their 
social-pragmatic abilities, for example, while making friends (Gertner, Rice, 
& Hadley, 1994) and interacting with teachers (Edwards & Mercer, 1986). 
In particular, after entering the school environment, the communicative 
situations that children are a part of become more complex, and the development 
of social-pragmatic skills helps children to interpret indirect utterances 
and communicate in socially accepted ways (Edwards & Mercer, 1986). 
Miscommunication can result in social difficulties, including discrimination by 
peers (see: Conti-Ramsden & Botting, 2004; Mackie & Law, 2010) and, thus, 
children’s social-pragmatic development should be assessed and supported if 
needed. 
In this study, the age of the children was found to have an effect on their ability 
to answer the different types of questions and provide explanations for correct 
answers. In line with earlier studies (e.g. Bosco & Gabbatore, 2017a, 2017b; 
Bucciarelli et al., 2003; Hudson & Slackman, 1990; Loukusa et al., 2007, 2008), 
it was found that the four-year-old children found it difficult to answer questions 
demanding social-pragmatic understanding, while by the age of seven and eight 
their performance was significantly better, although there was as yet no ceiling 
effect. This can be interpreted as indicating that, with age, children become more 
capable of directing their attention towards relevant information in utterance 
interpretation (Loukusa et al., 2008; Ryder & Leinonen, 2003). Development of 
social-pragmatic abilities is accompanied by development of various cognitive 
and language abilities (see Perkins, 2007, 2011). With increasing age children are 
more capable of managing inferential chains of different complexities (Bosco et 
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al., 2013; Bosco & Gabbatore, 2017a, 2017b; Harris & Pexman, 2003), express 
complex issues explicitly (Mäkinen, Loukusa, Nieminen, Leinonen, & Kunnari, 
2014) and reason about beliefs (Heiphetz et al., 2013). In this study, we found 
the most significant progress in children's social-pragmatic abilities occurred 
between four and six years of age, which is also the period when children’s ToM 
and other cognitive skills (e.g. self-monitoring and cognitive flexibility) are said 
to be developing rapidly (Diamond, 2002; Jones, Rothbart, & Posner, 2003; 
Wellman et al., 2001; Wimmer & Perner, 1983) and when children experience 
an increasing variety of different communicative situations (Milosky, 1992). 
When children’s social-pragmatic abilities develop, they become more 
capable of manipulating contextually and socially complex information in 
a relevant way (see also Vieiro & García-Madruga, 1997). In the present 
study, this was particularly shown in children’s increasing ability to answer 
questions requiring utilization of different kinds of contextual information, 
such as verbal and pictorial information, world knowledge, and understanding 
of others’ minds. A developmental trend between the age groups from four and 
eight years of age was demonstrated in the different tasks, and specifically in 
the tasks that demanded the processing of contextual information with ToM. 
In general, the findings of this study are in line with previous studies showing 
that the ability to utilize contextually relevant information develops between 
the ages of four and eight (e.g. Loukusa & Leinonen, 2008; Loukusa et al., 2008). 
In line with earlier studies (e.g. Bosco et al., 2013; Bucciarelli et al., 2003; 
Loukusa et al., 2007), the present study showed that children’s performance varies 
as a function of the contextual complexity of the task and the different degree 
of intentionality required. In this study, we found that questions demanding 
contextual processing without ToM were the easiest to understand, followed by 
questions demanding processing of others’ feelings and false beliefs (Contextual 
inference without ToM demand < Feelings recognition, False Beliefs < Contextual 
inference with ToM demand, Relevant language use). Most of the questions 
in the study required the children to deal with contextual factors and included 
the understanding of mental states and intentions. The Contextual inference 
with ToM demand questions, together with the questions demanding 
understanding of relevant language use, were the most challenging for 
the children. These questions require children to draw conclusions on the basis of 
information derived from different sources as well as to have the ability to take 
into account mental states of others, together with a general knowledge of 
social norms. ToM abilities develop during school age and keep developing 
during adolescence (Bosco et al., 2014). It is not surprising, therefore, that 
questions requiring the use of complex contextual information and ToM are the 
most difficult questions to answer. In many real-life communicative situations, 
the processing of various contextual cues and ToM contributes to understanding 
of nonliteral meanings and intentions (see also Schmid, 2012; Sperber 
& Wilson, 2012; Wilson, 2012). Developmentally, these abilities are shown in 
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children’s progressing ability to use relevant language according to different 
situations and understand what the other person really intends in different kinds 
of communication situations. Because these abilities have a multifactorial base, 
the social-pragmatic development is vulnerable to dysfunctions related to many 
areas of development, as mentioned previously (Cummings, 2009; Perkins, 
2007, 2011).
A further focus of the present study was to investigate children’s awareness 
of their comprehension processes by analyzing their explanations to correct 
answers. In this study, between the ages of four and five a developmental phase 
was identified in children’s ability to give appropriate explanations for their 
correct answers (four-year-olds explained 46% and five-year-olds 69% of their 
answers correctly). This shows an improvement in the children’s awareness of 
cognitive processes regulating utterance comprehension (see also Donaldson, 
1986; Loukusa et al., 2008).  Although, in our study, five-year-old children 
managed to explain most of their correct answers, it was only at the age of 
eight when they reached the level of 80% of correct explanations. Thus, in 
line with earlier findings (Letts & Leinonen, 2001; Loukusa et al., 2008), only 
older children could explicitly express the information they had used in their 
answers. In the light of our findings, it is not surprising that earlier studies 
have shown that children with different kind of childhood disorders, such as 
ASD (Loukusa & Moilanen, 2009), SLI (Letts & Leinonen, 2001) and ADHD 
(Loukusa, 2017), have difficulties when explaining their answers even if they 
succeeded in deriving an answer from the context. 
An accurate assessment of children’s pragmatic abilities requires tasks that are 
sufficiently challenging in order to reproduce real-life communicative situations, 
often requiring utilization of many contextual factors concurrently and quickly. 
Pragma is an assessment tool that reflects real-life social-pragmatic demands in 
a simulated approach in a structured test situation, allowing the identification 
of developmental trajectories and detection of potential difficulties in this area 
of functioning. The tasks were developed with the aim to give a comprehensive 
picture of the child’s social-pragmatic comprehension ability. In order to diminish 
the effects of purely linguistic skills (e.g. vocabulary and sentence structure), 
in line with earlier studies (Leinonen et al., 2003; Loukusa et al., 2007), 
the test scenarios and the questions were designed to be as linguistically simple 
as possible so that even the younger children would understand them. However, 
the linguistic complexity was not tested, which can be seen as a weakness of 
the study. The Pragma battery includes contextual inference questions with 
and without ToM demand, which make it possible to detect whether the child’s 
social-pragmatic difficulties are more generally caused by contextual 
comprehension problems or only appear when understanding of the mind of 
others is required. Moreover, Pragma’s questions have been categorized keeping 
in mind that social-pragmatic competence is the result of many interacting 
abilities (see Cummings, 2009; Gibbs & Colston, 2012; Perkins, 2007), and 
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thus the misunderstanding of utterances is not necessarily caused by only one 
background factor (e.g. ToM) but the interaction of different kind of factors (e.g. 
memory, inference, world knowledge and linguistic understanding). Therefore, 
when drawing conclusions about children’s abilities to answer different types of 
questions, interaction between different categories should be taken into account 
(e.g. contextual inference plays a central role in understanding the feelings of 
others in the questions of Pragma tasks).  
The method and materials used in this study enabled the investigation of 
the development of social-pragmatic comprehension. It would be interesting 
to examine their clinical validity in future studies of clinical populations. This 
is especially important now, when social (pragmatic) communication disorder 
is an accepted diagnosis in the DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013), and it seems that in 2018 in the forthcoming ICD-11 (World Health 
Organization, 2016) there will be a similar diagnostic category identified as 
a developmental language disorder with impairment of mainly pragmatic 
language. 
Further research concerning social-pragmatic abilities in typically developing 
children is still needed. Understanding developmental features in every age 
group allows us to better understand and support children’s abilities according 
to their actual social-pragmatic developmental level. This is particularly relevant 
in the modern technology-based society, where the way of interacting with other 
people is constantly changing. From a very young age, children are spending 
increasingly more time interacting with technologies than interacting face-to-face 
with people. This may pose new challenges for social-pragmatic development. 
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